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JURISDICTION OVER APPEAL 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court error in deciding as a matter of law that the electronic 
mail ("e-mail") communications between the parties did not constitute a binding contract 
concerning the sale of the subject assets, and that there were no genuine issues of material 
fact? [Record ("R.") at 55-66, 126 at pp. 7-11]. 
2. Did the trial court error in determining as a matter of law that, even if there 
was a contract for the sale of the subject assets, Defendants could rescind the contract at 
their sole discretion prior to the execution of the contract? [R. at 55-66, 126 at pp. 7-11]. 
The lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants is 
reviewed for correctness and the trial court's legal conclusions are given no particular 
deference. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, P.C v. Young, 2004 UT 26, ^ {10, 496 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (2004); Mast v. Overson, 971 P.2d 928, 931 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is about a binding contract created through e-mail correspondence 
between the parties. Plaintiff 1-800 Contacts, Inc. ("1800Contacts" or "Plaintiff) and 
Defendants Randolph Weigner ("Mr. Weigner"), Randolph Weigner 
DTVTV@Yahoo.com. and Lensfast, LLC ("Lensfast") (collectively "Defendants") 
entered into a valid and binding contract as expressed in their respective April 15, 2004 
1 
e-mails in which Defendants accepted Plaintiffs offer to purchase the assets of Lensfast 
for $800,000.00. Defendants, however, refused to honor the agreement when it was later 
presented to them in execution form. As a result, Plaintiff brought the present action to 
enforce the agreement. 
On August 8, 2004, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting 
that the e-mail communications did not evidence a meeting of the minds and that, even if 
they did, Defendants reserved the right to rescind the agreement to sell the subject assets 
prior to the execution of a written agreement. Oral argument on Defendants' motion for 
summary judgment was heard on December 13, 2004, before the Honorable Bruce C. 
Lubeck, Third District Court of Utah. That same day, the Court issued its Ruling and 
Order granting the motion for summary judgment, from which the present appeal arises. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. 1800Contacts is a direct seller of replacement contact lenses; selling lenses 
at discount prices to consumers who place orders by telephone, mail or over the Internet. 
[R.at69]. 
2. Lensfast is a Wyoming limited liability company that operates websites 
from which consumers can purchase contact lenses. [R. at 30]. 
3. Mr. Weigner is the sole shareholder of Lensfasl. [Id.]. 
4. In late March or early April 2004, Jonathan Coon, the CEO of 
1800Contacts, had a telephone conversation with Mr. Weigner wherein Mr. Coon, on 
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behalf of 1800Contacts, offered to purchase all rights to the domain name 
"contactlens.com" and the assets of Lensfast for the sum of $800,000.00. [R. at 69]. 
5. A few days later, Mr. Weigner called Mr. Coon and expressly stated, "I 
accept your offer." Mr. Coon responded by saying, in essence, "Randy, we've played 
tennis with this matter for years. Are we finally done here?" Mr. Weigner responded, 
"Yes, we're done. Have your lawyers draw up a contract." [Id.]. 
6. Mr. Coon then confirmed the terms of the agreement by saying, "just to be 
clear, we're paying $800,000 for all of the assets of LensFast including the database, 
phone numbers, and 'contactlens.com' - and we'll expect a basic non-compete." Mr. 
Weigner responded, "right." [Id.]. 
7. Mr. Coon then requested that Mr. Weigner send him an e-mail message 
confirming the agreement, which Mr. Weigner agreed to do. [R. at 70]. 
8. On April 13, 2004 at 9:58 a.m., Mr. Coon received an e-mail from Mr. 
Weigner, which he described as "an offer in principal to sell you the assets of Lensfast 
LLC including the domain name contactlens.com for $800,000.00." [R. at 10; A copy of 
the entire e-mail string (R. at 8-10) referenced herein is attached hereto as Addendum 
Exhibit ("Ex.") 1]. 
9. On or about April 15, 2004, Mr. Coon responded to Mr. Weigner's e-mail 
message by reply e-mail, which said, in pertinent part: 
We accept your offer to sell and agree to purchase the assets 
of LensFast LLC including: contactlens.com, lensfast.com, 
the name LensFast, the customer database for any LensFast 
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related companies, and any related internet domains or 
phone numbers associated with LensFast LLC. 
Standard with any transaction of this magnitude (and as we 
did with contactlenses.com), we will also expect a one year 
non-compete. Consideration will be included as part of the 
$800k purchase price. 
Email back acceptance (just an email that says 'we are in 
agreement on this email') and we will get to work on a short 
definitive agreement. 
[R. at 9-10, Ex. 1]. 
10. By e-mail message dated Thursday, April 15, 2004 at 12:25 p.m., Mr. 
Weigner responded, using the exact language for acceptance as requested by Mr. Coon, 
stating, 'Tw~)e are in agreement on this email." [R. at 8-9, Ex. 1 (emphasis added)]. 
11. Through the above-referenced communications, Mr. Coon believed that 
Plaintiff and Defendants had reached a valid, binding and enforceable agreement to 
purchase the domain name "contactlens.com" and the assets of Lensfast identified in the 
e-mail message, and to have a one-year non-compete agreement, for a purchase price of 
$800,000.00 (the "Agreement"). [R. at 71]. 
12. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff sent a formal written Asset Purchase Agreement 
to Mr. Weigner, containing the agreed-upon terms; however, Mr. Weigner refused to sign 
the APA and has since refused to honor the terms of the Agreement. [Id.]. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial erred in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment because 
there are material issues of fact to be decided by the jury. Based on its view of the 
evidence, the trial court determined that the parties had not reached an agreement 
concerning the sale of Lensfast's assets and that, even if an agreement had been entered 
into, Mr. Weigner could rescind his acceptance at any time. The trial court made this 
ruling by weighing the conflicting evidence, which constitutes reversible error in ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment. 
As explained more fully herein, the April 15th e-mail communications between 
Mr. Coon and Mr. Weigner constituted an offer and an acceptance of a valid, binding 
agreement for Plaintiffs purchase of the assets of Lensfast. Mr. Weigner accepted Mr. 
Coon's counteroffer to purchase the assets of Lensfast in the exact manner requested by 
Mr. Coon, without conditioning his acceptance in any manner. 
The parties' intent to execute a formal written agreement at a later time did not 
negate the April 15 Agreement. The trial court's determination that the escape clause 
contained in Mr. Weigner's April 13 e-mail message was also intended to apply to Mr. 
Weigner's April 15 e-mail message accepting Mr. Coon's counteroffer was an improper 
determination of a question of fact, because it involved weighing the evidence and 
deciphering Mr. Weigner's intentions - which is the exclusive province of the jury. 
The parties reached an agreement concerning the two essential terms of the April 
15 Agreement—the subject property and price—and therefore, specific performance is 
proper. At the very least, the evidence supports the determination that the parties reached 
a binding preliminary commitment, which obligated them to negotiate the open issues in 
good faith in an attempt to reach the contractual objective within the agreed framework. 
Defendants breached that binding preliminary commitment by unjustifiably abandoning 
their agreement on the basic terms that had already been agreed upon, and refusing to 
execute or finalize the formal agreement. The trial court's ruling should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
THAT THE E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND 
DEFENDANTS DID NOT CONSTITUTE A BINDING AGREEMENT AND, 
EVEN IF IT DID, DEFENDANTS COULD RESCIND IT ANYWAY. 
In order to grant summary judgment, a trial court must determine that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. In other words, a trial court must determine that, based on the 
uncontroverted evidence, there is no choice but to enter judgment as a matter of law in 
favor of the moving party. See Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291, 1292 (Utah 1978) 
(explaining that court cannot consider weight of testimony or credibility of witness on 
motion for summary judgment); see also W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources 
Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981) (emphasizing that on a motion for summary judgment, 
it is inappropriate for the court to weigh disputed evidence; the sole inquiry is whether 
there is a material issue of fact to be decided). 
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In essence, the trial court must determine that no fact finder, be it a jury or the 
judge, could reasonably decide in favor of the non-moving party based on the undisputed 
facts.1 Furthermore, on summary judgment, all facts must be construed in favor of the 
non-moving party, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. 
See Reliable Furniture, 398 P.2d at 688 (holding that non-movant's "contentions as to the 
facts should be considered in the light most favorable to him.. . and any doubts which 
exist should be resolved in favor of affording him the privilege of a trial"). 
Here, Plaintiff has established sufficient facts upon which a reasonable fact finder 
could find in favor of Plaintiff (i.e., that the parties intended to have a binding agreement, 
which Defendants improperly refused to honor). At the very least, Plaintiff has set forth 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there are genuine issues of material fact for the 
jury to determine. The trial court erred by not denying Defendants' motion. 
A. A Reasonable Fact Finder Could Find That The April 15, 2004 E-mail 
Communications Between Mr. Weigner And Mr. Coon Resulted In A 
Valid, Binding Agreement. 
A binding contract or agreement is comprised of two "primary" elements: (1) an 
offer, and (2) acceptance. See Utah Ass 'n of Credit Men v. McConnell, 167 P. 817, 820 
(Utah 1917) (stating that "the primary elements of a contract" are "an offer and 
1
 See Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 354 P.2d 559, 561 (Utah 1960) 
(showing in support of summary judgment "must preclude all reasonable possibility that the 
loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which would reasonably sustain a judgment in his 
favor"); see also Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, 398 
P.2d 685, 688 (Utah 1965) (summary judgment should be granted "only if it clearly appears that 
[the non-movant] could not establish a right to recovery"). 
i 
acceptance"). Here, the April 15, 2004 e-mails exchanged between Mr. Weigner and Mr. 
Coon constitute a valid offer and acceptance of the material terms of the Agreement. 
Whether there has been an offer and acceptance turns on the intentions of the 
parties, which, absent ambiguity, is to be determined from within the four-comers of the 
agreement. See Foote v. Taylor, 635 P.2d 46, 48 (Utah 1981). If the agreement is deemed 
to be ambiguous as to the intent of the parties, the Court may consider extraneous 
evidence. See Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). 
The determination of intent to enter into a binding agreement is a question of fact 
to be determined by the fact-finder. See O 'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 
1981) ("Whether the parties intended to enter a binding contract is such an issue of fact;" 
holding that issue of the parties' intent to enter into a binding contract is one of fact and 
should have been submitted to the jury); Thornton v. Pasch, 139 P.2d 1002, 1003 (Utah 
1943) ("The question of whether defendants did accept or assent to plaintiffs offer is a 
question of fact;'5 remanding to trial court to submit issue of acceptance to jury). 
Likewise, where "evidence as to the terms of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of the 
parties as to the terms of the agreement is to be determined by the jury." Colonial 
Leasing Co. of New England, Inc. v. Larsen Bros. Construction Co., 731 P.2d 483, 488 
(Utah 1986) (holding that intent of parties as to terms of contract is a question of fact that 
precludes summary judgment). 
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Mr Coon's April 15, ?004 e-mail to Mr. Weigner states: 
uui oiler to sell and agree to purchase the assets 
j.a LLC including: contactlens.com, lensfast.com, 
o LensFast. the customer database for any LensFast 
related companies, and any related internet domains or 
phone numbers associated with LensFast I I C 
Standard with any transaction oi ilns i.i.ignitude (and as w e 
did with contactlenses.com), we will also expect a one year 
non-compete. Consideration will be included as part of the 
$800k purchase price. 
uyi'in 
Email back acceptance (just an email that says 4we are in 
agreement on this email') nnd we will get to work on a 
short, definitive agreement. 
[R. at 9, Ex. I (emphasis added)],. 
]\ Ir. Coon further stated in the same e-mail that "[w]e either have an agreement or 
V U " i l l III! "I II 
resources playing tennis.. . ." [R. at 9-10, Ex. 1], 
Mr. Weigner accepted 1800Contacts' offer in precisely the same manner and 
language requested by Mr. Coon by stating in his i Vpril 15,, 20(11 reply e-mail lliiil || || 
are In agreement on this email ' [R at 8 9, Ex 1 ( = i: : phasis added)]. Based on'those 
two April 15, 2004 e-mails, a valid counteroffei was made; an effective acceptance 
occurred; and a binding contract was fonned for the sale oi \ VILMUM ^ assets. 
ill (lie wi \ Ir.isl, tlinr ,itc }?,einimr issiirs o( iniali nal fuel n»iiaTii(iu» w lirllini lllln 
April 15, 2004 e-mail communications comprised a valid offer and acceptance, such that 
n 
the parties intended to be bound by this agreement. Mr. Weigner's subsequent refusal to 
sign the written Asset Purchase Agreement cannot negate the fact that he accepted Mr. 
Coon's offer, using precisely the same language for acceptance requested by Mr. Coon, 
without reservation or condition. 
B. The Escape Clause in Mr. Weigner's April 13, 2004 E-Mail is 
Inapplicable to the April 15, 2004 Agreement 
The trial court erroneously looked beyond the April 15, 2004 e-mails, which 
contain the requisite contractual elements of an offer and acceptance, to conclude that 
Mr. Weigner did not intend to enter into a binding agreement and that, even if an 
agreement was entered into, Defendants could rescind it at any time prior to the execution 
of a formal agreement. It was reversible error for the trial court to weigh the evidence 
regarding the parties' intentions in this respect. 
In his April 13, 2004 e-mail, Mr. Weigner set forth an offer to sell the assets of 
Lensfast to 1800Contancts with the following escape clause: 
This offer is entirely dependent on my agreement with your 
attorney's terms and conditions for the acquisition and is not 
to be considered legally binding until a physically executed 
contract between our two companies is completed. Until the 
time said contract is executed I may, at my sole discretion, 
rescind or modify this offer in any way I see fit. 
[R. at 10, Ex. 1]. It is undisputed that Mr. Weigner's April 13, 2004 offer, which 
contained the above escape clause, was not accepted by Mr. Coon. [R. at 9-10, Ex. 1]. 
Although Mr. Coon began his April 15, 2004 e-mail to Mr. Weigner by purporting to 
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accept the April 1 ^, 2004 offei , the plain language of the e-mail demonstrates li.... ™'Qs 
Specifically, Mr. Coon requested in his April 15, 2004 counter-offer that Mi. 
Weigner "[e]mail back acceptance (just an email that says 'we are in agreement on 
this email )' andfurthei slated ||n i]r ulliui Imu ,III JJJH, rmenl MI v\r ilmu'l II w I 
let's get it done. If we don't ice's not waste each other's time and resources playing 
tenuis , " [R .; r,-10, Hx. I uniphasis added)]. 
Signer responded ^ • •* •• -
 M;. aat same day and in the 
- • - *. V' | lliji.; i n i i i i l , " j R , 
at 8]. Significantly, in accepting Mr. Coon's counteroffer, Mr. Weigner did not attempt 
to re-impose the escape clause contained in his Apn; ! l e-maii i hat escape clause, on 
its face, appl led or • - - :. ; • 
entirely dependent on . . . . I may, at my sole discretion, rescind or modify this offer in 
anyway 1 see fit.'" rK at 10, F\ 1 (emphasis added)], \ jury could reasonably 
out of his acceptance of Mr. Coon's April 15" counteroffer. 
Furthermore. b\ "ranting Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the trial 
court improperh *.^;u^. naintiff the opportunity to conduct discovery a* u -. - "aiher 
I Ill s VeipncT intended to abaihlun the \ mulilioir.1 ui Ins r'.rapr i lausc h\ h ,i \\\\\ ill inill Il 
his acceptance of the counteroffer, and (ii) the reason(s) why Mr. Weigner refused to sign 
the written Asset Purchase Agreement that memorialized the agreement. If Defendants' 
1 1 
decision to not execute the formal agreement was made in bad faith, then Defendants 
breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which inheres in every contract. 
See St Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199-200 (Utah 1991) 
(explaining that every contract includes covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also 
Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 366 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("There is no 
reason why an enforceable agreement to agree does not give rise to the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing."). 
This case is similar to the 1924 case of Calumet Refining Co. v. Star Lubricating 
Co., 230 P. 1028 (Utah 1924), where the issue was whether two telegrams constitutes a 
binding contract, or whether the wording of the offeree's reply telegram was a 
conditional acceptance of the offeror's telegram. The Utah Supreme Court upheld the 
trial court's determination that a binding contract was formed, even though the 
acceptance contained language indicating that a written contact would yet be prepared 
and delivered. See id. at 1029-30. The Court quoted from Williston on Contracts (2d Ed) 
§ 78, stating: 
Sometimes an acceptor from an abundance of caution inserts a 
condition in his acceptance which merely expresses what would be 
implied in fact or in law from the offer. As such a condition does 
not interfere with the expression of assent to all terms of the offer, 
a binding contract is formed. 
Id. at 1029. 
Likewise, here, the trial court should have recognized that Mr. Weigner's April 
15th e-mail, accepting Mr. Coon's counteroffer, represents an expression of assent to all 
12 
the material term> oi Hie counteroffer, sufficient to form a ,Mhdmg conn act. I he trial 
nun! I IOVU/UT umiu 'n i isk il i i lntinitial Midi ,is ,1 nu l la I l.im Mm Wrn ' i in did not 
intend to enter into a v alid, binding agreement and that, even if an agreement was entered 
into, he could rescind the April 15th Agreement in his sole discretion. At the very least, 
clause of his 4pi II 13th e-mail to apply to his April 15th acceptance of Mr. Coon's 
counteroffer. Either way, summary judgment was improper. 
I he Parties5 Intent to Execute a Formal Agreement Al a LitkT Date 
Does Not Invalidate the April 15, 2004 Agreement 
'|-|v, !v.rties' intent to later adopt a formal written agreement does not prevent the 
enforceability of the April 15. 2004 Agreement. See. -e.g., Raml-Wliitney Packaging 
Corp, .nrtsi, . in\/i;p, nu l - ' *• Ju.oiiu/i^ui 
letter -P-M:? -o** • : ^ .: in--. ;r : \-,-:l ••* •.-. -set-... • >th 
parties to be a binding agreement, which contained 'he essential terms necessary lor 
specific performance, despite intent to enter a foi iiial written agreement at a later time). 
\ i tl.i lnl in , ml Ihr IJrsl i i lnmii l itl ('onliiirts (Smmdl |iii|iim(cst<iliniiv- I 
assent that are in themselves sufficient to conclude a contract will not be prevented from 
so operating by the fact that the parties also manifest an intention to prepare and adopt a 
v nllni mcmoiiiil llietnil ,( Uesliilcnuiil nl ( unli in IL, (Si/ntnil) ) }^, 
rhe trial court improperly relied upon Comment b to § 27 of the Restatement on 
Contracts, to hold that there was no enforceable agreement. Comment b states: 
On the other hand, if either party knows or has reason to 
know that the other party regards the agreement as incomplete 
and intends that no obligation shall exist until other terms are 
assented to or until the whole has been reduced to another 
written form, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do 
not constitute a contract. 
Restatement on Contracts (Second) § 27, Comment b. While this may be a correct 
principle of law, it simply does not support the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
this case. 
The trial court could only apply this legal principle by weighing the evidence 
regarding the parties' intentions. For instance, in applying this principle, the trial court 
had to review the string of e-mail messages and conclude, based on its view of the 
evidence, that Mr. Weigner intended for the escape clause in his April 13 e-mail to 
apply as well to his April 15th e-mail accepting Mr. Coon's counteroffer (even though the 
escape clause was left out of the April 15 e-mail). To weigh the evidence in this 
manner and make such a factual determination was improper. The trial court 
wrongfully invaded the province of the jury. The trial court's ruling, therefore, must be 
reversed.2 
2
 See, e.g., Sandberg, 576 P.2d at 1292 (explaining that court cannot consider weight of 
testimony or credibility of witness on motion for summary judgment); W.M. Barnes Co., 627 
P.2d at 59 (emphasizing that on a motion for summary judgment, it is inappropriate for the court 
to weigh disputed evidence; the sole inquiry is whether there is a material issue of fact to be 
decided); see also Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 488 ("If evidence as to the terms of an 
agreement is in conflict, the intent of the parties as to the terms of the agreement is to be 
determined by the jury;" holding that intent of parties as to terms of contract is a question of fact 
that precludes summary judgment). 
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Plaintiff And Defendants Reached An Agreement Concerning the 
Material Terms of the Purchase Agreement And Plaintiff Is Entitled 
To Specific Performance Of The Agreement. 
The April 15, 2004 e-mails between Mr. Coon and Mr. Wemner contain sufficient 
material terms of the Agreement to be enforced by this Court. Material terms are those 
Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (holding Dial real est* ••• 
contract w as sufficiemh delink ^ 1 v enforced, despite lacking description of property 
.- ^UUKMJU,. in order for a contract to K CiiioKeab.^ there must be a meeting of the 
1111110* ' T W n i r ' n ^ U h *' : . • • >• ^ 
Clayton, 863 P.2d 29. P (I Hah Ct. App, 1993) (affirming trial court's finding oi a 
meeting of the minds regarding lease despite lack of signed written agreement). 
M < ! . -^ tne material 
terms of the Apii* .5 , 2004 Agi^cmciit, winch are (i) the f * ••^•i- s \ • i1.1 
the assets of Lensfast and the domain name "eontaeflens com," and (2) the purchase price 
of $800,000 00 [R at 8 9, E. ? ; 1] t ""i dditional 1> , u ic parties agreed upon the manner of 
payment. [Id.]. The parties' unequivocal agreement on 1 lie nia1en.il terms of lh< Apnl 
15? 2004 Agreement is more than adequate to create a binding and enforceable contract. 
Because die material terms of the Api il I,! „ 1005 Agreement ha\ e been agreed 
upon, 1800Contacts is entitled to specific pei tbrmanceot the i\ greement Specific 
performance does not require that every single term be definite, so long as the parties 
have agreed upon the material terms, which is the case here. See, e.g., Barker, < 41 P nd 
at 551-552 (affirming that earnest money agreement was sufficiently definite to be 
enforced despite not identifying the subject property). 
American Jurisprudence 2d succinctly states the prevailing rule: 
The mere fact that a contract that is definite in material 
respects contains some terms that are subject to further 
negotiations between the parties will not bar a decree for 
specific performance. 
71 Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 61 (emphasis added). 
As stated above, the April 15th Agreement is sufficiently definite as to its material 
terms. At the very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the parties 
reached an agreement on the material terms of the contract. Accordingly, the lower 
court's granting of summary judgment should be reversed. 
E. At The Very Least, The Evidence Supports The Determination That 
The Parties Entered Into a Binding Preliminary Commitment. 
At a minimum, the April 15th e-mails show that the parties agreed upon the 
fundamental terms, namely, the assets, the purchase price, the use of an escrow agent, 
and the provision for a standard one-year non-competition clause. Although some open 
issues may have remained to be negotiated and finalized (such as the more specific 
details of the non-compete clause), courts recognize that such agreements on the basic 
material terms are "preliminary agreements that are binding and enforceable." See 
Burbach Broadcasting Co. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2002); see 
also Teachers Insurance & Annuity Assoc, v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491, 498 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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Courts have recognized, "the importance of enforcing and preserving agreements 
ili.il "Mir ntuidnl .is hiiiiliiij.1, mk"S[nie d iiei'd loi lurlher docuinuilalion 01 iuilher 
negotiation." Burbach Broadcast!mi 278 i;.3dat407 Following this "' model nl i < mdi. ni, 
contract law," courts have recognized the "pragmatism and commercial necessity of 
• *, i i/.uu . ::c,
 :,_.»i ecause: 
i_A uiiiumg pidnmiiiU) agio \u u\\ prevents parties from 
arbitrarily abandoning negoiuhons. and therefore provides an 
assurance that a deal w ill Sailer .mh o\ er a genuine disagreement 
and not due to a dispute o\ei ihe "niajoi' teiois of the agreement, 
which ha\e alreadv been agreed to in the parties. 
iu '* ' scaling to negouuu .ie open issues 
in good faith, "a party is barred from renouncing the deal, abandoning : * •e*jo*m.. 01 
insisting on conditions that do not conform to the preliminary agreement. Id. at 407. 
I lie ei idence in this case cani easonably be interpreted to support the existence of 
a binding preliminary commitment. Durum ihrir lelcphom discussions "hi' ii pitveik'd 
the e-mail communications, Mr.. Coon and Vh, Weigner reached an agreement on the 
LiMi, uiuiteiial lei ins ol tlicagreem.ei.it Thai is, Mr. Weigner agreed, to sell to 
ISOOContacts all rights lo (lie domain iiiinit- "i imlaelluis i inn1 ,n il lhe assets ol 1 enslast 
for the sum of $800,000,00'. [R at 69, Ex J I A lew days later, Mr. Weigner called. Mr. 
Coon and express I) stated, "I accept your oiler." Mr. Coon responded by saying, in 
essence, '''.Randy,, we've played I'liiii;-1 vvifli Ihis mafia loi .cais Arc we finally done 
here?" Mi Weigner responded, "Yes, we're done. Have MMW lnw\crs \\\\\\\ | 
contract." [ Id |, Mr Coon confirmed the terms by saying, "just lo be clear, we're paying 
$800,000 for all of the assets of LensFast including the database, phone numbers, and 
'contactlens.com' - and we'll expect a basic non-compete." Mr. Weigner responded, 
"right." [Id.].3 
Out of an abundance of caution, Mr. Coon then requested Mr. Weigner to send 
him an e-mail message to confirm the agreement, which led to the string of e-mail 
messages referenced herein. Based on this evidence, a jury could reasonable conclude 
that the parties reached a binding preliminary commitment on the basic material terms of 
the agreement, and that the parties were under a duty of good faith to negotiate and/or 
finalize the remaining issues. Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the lower Court's granting of 
summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 2 IST day of April 2005. 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
Paxton R. Guymon, Esq. 
Joel T. Zenger, Esq. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
See Lawrence Construction Company v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982) 
(explaining that "[i]f a written agreement is intended to memorialize an oral contract, a 
subsequent failure to execute the written document does not nullify the oral contract."). 
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I fiereby certify ffi;tl f :im emplmml h1. ilm l\\\ Ii m nil Mil i I if < ii \\ Mi >M I i ' „ 
165 Regent Street. Salt Lake City; Utah 841 i 1, and that pursuant to Rule 5(b), Utah 
Rules ^1 11 vi J i-W-cdure, a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPEL1 i "in PI I ill ' i ill , i l l mi I II ,i i miiiii i it nil iii line IOIIOW nig mis n '" an\ ot 
April, 2005, by: 
| | I land Delivery 
| | K'lesitniU* 
1X | Depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
| | Federal Express 
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Denver C. Snuffer 
Daniel B. Garriott 
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10885 South State 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
1-800 CONTACS, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
RANDOLPH WEIGNER, an individual; 
RANDOLPH WEIGNER 
DTVTV@YAHOO.COM: and 
LENSFAST, LLC, a Wyoming limited 
liability company; 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20050036 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
1-800 CONTACTS, INC. 
Appeal from a Ruling and Order of the Third District Court, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Dated December 13,2004, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck. 
Tabl 
—Original Message 
7rom: Contactlens.com [mailto:lensfast@yahoo.com] 
Sent: Friday, April 16, 2004 8:45 AM 
To: Jonathan Coon 
Subject RE: contactlens.com 
lonathan, 
Please have your legal people draw up the contract. 
I'll be at the National Assn. of Broadcasters 
Convention in Las Vegas until Wednesday. If you need 
to reach me please call the cell (603) 520-1127. 
Thanks, 
Randy 
— Jonathan Coon <Jonathan@1800contacts.com> wrote: 
>Roy: 
> 
> Please prepare a brief, plain English agreement 
> using the agreed upon 
> terms below. 
> 
> Randy, we should have something to you next week. 
> We will send it 
> directly to you. If you can email contact info for 
> your counsel, we 
> will copy them as well. 
> 
> Thanks, 
> 
> - Jonathan 
> 
> 
> Original Message 
> From: Contactlens.com [mailto:lensfastfg)vahoo com] 
> Sent: Thursday, April 15, 2004 12:25 PM 
> To: Jonathan Coon 
> Subject: contactlens.com 
> 
> We are in agreement on this email. 
> 
> Concerning the non-compete, I'm doing contact lens 
> fulfillment for an online pharmacy which I am 
> contractually obligated to continue. I will agree no 
> company I own personally in whole or in part will 
> advertise or sell contacts to the public for one 
> year. 
> 
> Thanks, 
andy 
- Jonathan Coon <Jonathan@1800contacts.com> wrote: 
Randy: 
Sorry for the delay. Your email got screened by 
ur 
junk mail program. 
I have added this email address to Outlook and my 
• whitelist, so it 
- should come through next time. 
- We accept your offer to sell and agree to purchase 
> the assets of 
> LensFast LLC including: contactlens.com, 
>
 lensfast.com, the name 
> LensFast, the customer database for any lensfast 
> related companies, and 
> any related internet domains or phone numbers 
> associated with LensFast 
>LLC. 
> 
> Standard with any transaction of this magnitude 
[and 
> as we did with 
> contactlenses.com), we will also expect a one year 
> non-compete. 
> Consideration will be included as part of the 
$800k 
> purchase price. 
> 
> We will accept Campbell & Tannenwald as the escrow 
> agent. 
> 
> Email back acceptance (just an email that says "we 
> are in agreement on 
> this email") and we will get to work on a short 
> definitive agreement. 
> This email from the 13th was clearly written by 
> counsel I sent it to 
> our counsel and they wrote a lengthy response 
which 
> they asked me to 
> send back. I tossed a bunch of the CYA stuff and 
> boiled it down to this 
> email. 
> 
• > Let's both try to keep this simple. I have asked 
- > our counsel to keep 
> > the document short and in plain English. I can't 
- > guarantee that someone 
* > getting paid by the hour won't try to make things 
>
 > more complicated, but 
>
 > let's both direct our counsel not to run up the 
>bill 
>
 > on this. We either 
> > have an agreement or we don't. If we do, let's 
>get 
> > it done. If we 
> > don't, let's not waste each other's time and 
> > resources playing tennis 
• with a document. 
• Thanks, 
- Jonathan 
> Original Message 
> From: Contactlens.com [mailto:lensfast@vahoo.com1 
> Sent: Tuesday, April 13, 2004 9:58 AM 
> To: Jonathan Coon 
> Subject: contactlens.com 
> 
> Jonathan, 
> This is an offer in principal to sell you the 
assets 
> of Lensfast LLC including the domain name 
> contactlens.com for $800,000.00. This offer is 
> entirely dependent on my agreement with your 
> attorney's terms and conditions for the 
acquisition 
> and is not to be considered legally binding until 
a 
> physically executed contract between our two 
> companies 
> is completed. Until the time said contract is 
> executed 
> I may, at my sole discretion, rescind or modify 
this 
> offer in any way I see fit. 
• > The contract must include a provision to have the 
• > entire $800,000.00 placed in escrow with my 
- > attorney, 
" > Peter Tannenwald of Irving, Campbell & Tannenwald 
> in 
• > Washington, DC prior to transferring any assets of 
> > Lensfast LLC to 800 Contacts. 
> > Thank you for your offer and please have your 
> > attorney 
> > contact me at your earliest convenience. 
>> 
> > Sincerely, 
> > Randolph Weigner 
> > Lensfast LLC 
> > (800) Lensfast (536-7327) 
>> 
>> 
> > ===== 
> > Please Note: A 6 pack is a box of 6 identical 
> > lenses. Order online at 
> > Lensfast.com or Contactlens.com or call us toll 
> free 
> > at (877)Lensfast 
> > (536-7327) we'll be glad to help. 
> > 
>> 
>> 
> > 
> > 
>> Do you Yahoo!? 
> > Yahoo! Small Business $15K Web Design Giveaway 
